Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1980

Nanette Dixon, Val Humpherys and Carrie
Humpherys v. William Stoddard and Darlene
Stoddard : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
R. C. SKEEN; Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant Dale M. Dorius; Attorney for DefendentRespondents
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Dixon v. Stoddard, No. 16876 (Utah Supreme Court, 1980).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2133

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREM1~ COURT OF THE STATE OF UT.AH

-------------------------------NANETTE DIXON, VAL HUMPHZ~YSi )
and CARRIE HUMPHERYS ,
)
\
)

Plaintiff":-:-~llant,

)
)
)

vs.

)

Case No. J.687S

)

WILLIAM STODDARD artd DARLENE

)

STODDARD,

)
)

DefendantsRes"?ondents.

---------

.

______

)
)
)

PAIEF OF APPELLANT

~ppeal

from the Judgment of the F:i..L.·~L Dis t::-ict Court
in and f~r Box Elc.er Cour:t:1
Bo~0~dble Led S. ~er.~y

R. C. SKEEN
SJ.G:EN AND SKEEN
536 East 400 South
3~!: Lake City, Utah 84102
Attorneys for
Plaintiff-Appellant

DALE M. D\!R.tliS
P. 0. Box lJ
?.9 South Main. 2 :rePt
Brigham City, Utah 84302
Attorney for
Defendants-Respcndents
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DIXON, VAL HUMPHERYS, )
and CARRIE HUMPHERYS ,
)

NANETTE

PlaintiffAppellant,
vs.

WILLIAM STODDARD and DARLENE
STODDARD,
DefendantsRes-pondents .

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 16876

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-)

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from the Judgment of the First District Court
in and for Box Elder County
Honorable Ted S. Perry

R. C. SKEEN
SKEEN AND SKEEN
536 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Attorneys for
Plaintiff-Appellant
DALE M. DORIUS
P. 0. Box U

29 South Main Street
Brigham City, Utah 84302
Attorney
for
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Defendants-Respondents
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page(s)
Cases Cited

eooeo••••••••••••••••••••••oo~o••OG••

Text Books Cited

ii

••••••••••••••••••••••••••ooooao

ii

Statement of Kind of Ca.se . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

Disposition in Lower Court . . . .. . . .. . . . . .. .. . . .. .

1

Relief Sought on Appeal .. .. . .. . . . . . .. . . . . .. .. ...

1

Statement of Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2

Argument

7

••••••••••••••••••••••••••o•••••cio•o•aae

Point I

That the Jury's Special Verdict
was not Supported by Competent
Evidence

7

A.

That there was no Fraudulent and .
Material Alteration

7

B.

That the evidence that the Promissory Note was Signed in Blank was
not Competent

9

C.

That the Court's Instruction No. 2. 12
and Special Verdict No. 1 were in
Error and Mislead the Jury

Point I I

The Plaintiffs' Motion to Set
Aside the Judgment and for a New
Trial Should Have Been Granted

14

A.

The Newly Discovered Evidence
Determinative of the Case

B.

Based upon the Discovery of New
Evidence which by Due Diligence
Could not have been Discovered

c.

Based Upon Other Reason Justifying. 20
Relief from the Operation of the
Judgment

Point III

w~s

.. 14
18

The Jury's Finding as to Attorney's 20
Fees was not Supported by the
Evidence

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Conclusion
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 21
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CASES CITED

Provo River Water Users Association vs. Carlson ........
6 U 2d 161, 308 P2d 264 p. 782
Burk vs. Peter, 202 P2d 543, 115 Utah 58

9
13, 14

TEXT BOOKS CITED
Section 70A-3-115 UCA 1953 ............................

8

Section 70A-3-307 UCA 1953, Subsection (2) ............

7

Section 70A-3-406 UCA 1953

•••••11•••0•o•oe•ooooooo11•(ile•

11

Section 70A-3-407 UCA 1953

o••••••••oeeo11ooooooeo•oooot1

11

Section 70A-3-·408 UCA 1953

•••••••eooeooooeooooeooeooci•

13

Section

78-24~2

3,5,9,11,
12 and 13

UCA 1953

Rule 59b, Rules of Civil Procedure .................... 18
Rule 60> Rules of Civil Procedure ..................... 18, 19
Rule 60a, Rules of Civil Procedure ..................... 18
8

11 C.J.S. 45, Section 652

ii

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

NANETTE DIXON, VAL HUMPHERYS, )
and CARRIE HUMPHERYS,
)
PlaintiffAppellant,
vs.
WILLIAM STODDARD and DARLENE
STODDARD,
DefendantsRespondents.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 16876

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~)

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action by the heirs to enforce a
promissory note.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury which rendered a
verdict that there was a material and fraudulent alteration
in the promissory note.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks an order reversing the District
Court and entering Judgment for plaintiff for the amount of
the unpaid balance of the note plus interest and costs, or,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

in the alternative, ordering a new trial.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an action by the heirs of Glen S. Humpherys
to enforce a promissory note (Exhibit P-2) dated December 30,
1967.

The promissory note was given to Glen S. Humpherys as

part of an agreement (Exhibit P-3) between defendant and Glen
S. Humpherys in accordance with which Glen S. Humpherys sold
and delivered to defendants his drug store inventory, prescription inventory, and prescription files.
The agreement provided that an inventory be taken of
the drugstore items by "The Rocky Mountain Wholesale Inventory
Crew" and the value-determined to set the sales price, part of
which was to be paid by def f ered payment as provided in the
note (Exhibit P-2).
The defendants made periodic payments to Glen S.
Humpherys from February 2, 1968, until April 30, 1975, when
Mr. Humpherys died.

Defendant then made payments in May, June,

August, September and November of 1975 to Glen S. Humpherys'
heir~,

at which time defendants refused to make additional pay-

ments.

The ur.paid balance of the note, as found by the jury,

was $12,693.81.

(R. 113)

During the course of the trial, the defendants were
permitted to testify that the ,promissory note in question was
signed by them at a time when the amount of the note was blank
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and that they did not know who completed the blanKs.
plaintiff objected to the questions

J.ne

giving rise to the

above testimony, on the ground that the defendants were not
competent to be a witness to such facts as.provided by
Section 78-24-2 UCA 1953 (the dead man's statute).

(T-27-

29)

After both sides had rested their respective cases,
plaintiff made a motion for a directed verdict which was
taken under advisement.
The following jury instruction to which plaintiff
took exception was given:
"The Plaintiffs claim that the Defendants,
on or about December 30, 1967, executed and
delivered to Glen S ·. : Humpherys a promissory
note, ·and that the Plaintiffs are the owners
and holders of said note because of the death
of Glen S. Humpherys. The Plaintiffs further
claim that there is a balance owing on the note
which has not been paid.
"The Defendants admit that they signed the
promissory note in blank, that the amount and
date of the note were not filled in at the time
the Defendants signed the same. The Defendants
claim that the amount and date of. the note were
filled in without their knowledge or permission.
"You are instructed that any alteration of
a promissory note is material which changes the
contract of any part thereto in any respect,
including any such change in an incomplete instrument, by completing it otherwise than as authorized. But there is no material alteration of a
promissory note if the holder completes an incomplete instrument as authorized by the maker or
makers.
"You are further instructed that fraudulent
consists of sotne deceitful ·practice or willful
device resorted to with intent to deprive another
of his right or in some manner to do him an injury."
(R. 100)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services

-3-

Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The case was submitted to the jury on a special
verdict.

Question No. l, to which plaintiffs took exception·,

was a.s follows:
"Was there any fraudulent and material
alteration of the promissory note now bea~ing
date of December 30, 1967, by the plaintiffs,
or any of them, or by Glen S. Humpherys:
ANSWER 'YES' or 'NO':

Yes

"

The special interrogatory was answered in the
affirmative.
The other special interrogatories and the answers
as found by the jury are as follows:
.,Question No. 2:
"State how much money, if any, has been paid
to Glen S. Humpherys or to the plaintiffs on the·
note bearing ~ate of December 30, 1967, by stating
the amount paid on

A.

The Principal

$

12,496.93

B.

The Interest

$

6,197.73"

and give the date and amount of the last payment on
Amount of
Last Payment

Date of
Last Paym~nt

A.

The Principal

$

35.11

11/1/75

B.

The Interest

$

64.89

'11/1/75

"Question No·. 3:
"Give the amount of a reasonable attorney's fee for
bringing this action.
$

-0-

"
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The following was added by the jury without instruction and not responding to any special question:
"We recommend that plaintiff remove the items
in question from the basement of Mack's Pharmacy.
We also feel that plaintiff does not have a valid
case because of insufficient evidence." (R. 113)
The jury ruled that there was a fraudulent and
material alteration of the promissory note in question.
Plaintiff made a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict and for a new trial based upon admission of evidence
.which should have been excluded by Section 78-24-2, UCA 1953,
and that the defendants, after admitting their signatures,
had not introduced any evidence to prove that there was an
unauthorized completion of the promissory note in question.

(R. 115)
The motions were denied by the trial judge and a
memorandum decision was issued.

(R. 133)

The decision stated

in part ... "no evidence was presented as to any inventory being
taken and the jury could believe the amount on the note was
entered without authority".
Prior to and during the time this lawsuit was pending, plaintiff had been searching for the evidence of the
inventory.

(See Affidavit of Nanette Dixon).

On February 3,

1979, after the case had been appealed, plaintiff discovered
the evidence which set forth the inventory, including the original adding machine tapes made in the inventory process and the
suimilary, hereafter referred to as "new evidence", the originals
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of which are attached to the affidavit of Mr. G. Don Kennedy
which is filed to support plaintiffs' motion to vacate the
judgment and for an order for a new trial.

All of these

documents are filed with plaintiffs' motion to stay the appeal
pending a ruling by the district court to vacate the judgment
and for a new trial or in the alternative to dismiss the appea:
without prejudice to another appeal on the same issues after
disposition of plaintiffs' motion for a new trial in the district court based upon the ground of newly discovered evidence
and upon the ground that the Judgment should be vacated in the
interest of justice in view of the newly discovered evidence.
(R. 152)
Becau~e

an appeal was pending

~t

the time the above

motion was filed, Plaintiff made a motion to the Supreme Court
to dismiss the appeal without prejudice to another appeal after
consideration of plaintiffs' motion.

This motion was granted,

after which the trial court denied plaintiffs' motion

for a

new trial (R. 181) on the grounds that the newly discovered
evidence could have been discovered by due diligence

~nd

the new evidence would not have changed the result.
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that

ARGUMENT

I

THAT THE JURY'S SPECIAL VERDICT
WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE
A.

THAT THERE WAS NO FRATJDIILENT AND MATE.RIAL

ALTERATION.
The promissory note in question is typed with lines
provided for the amount, both numerically and written out, and
for the date.

These items have been written in in pen and ink.

There is no indication of erasures, alterations, cross-outs, or
other changes.

There is nothing to indicate an improper or

unauthorized completion.

It is common practice to negotiate

checks and other negotiable instruments completed in such a
fashion.

That is, with the amount or date, or both, completed

by typewriter, rubber stamp, or in handwriting obviously different than the signature on such document.
Section 70A-3-307 UCA 1953, Subsection (2) provides:
"When signatures are admitted or established,
production of the instrument entitles a holder
to recover on it unless the defendant establishes
a defense."
In the instant case, defendants admitted that they signed the
promissory note in question.

The above quoted section there-

fore places the burden of proving a defense on the defendant.
This is consistent with general case law.
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In Section 652 of 11 CJS 45, it is stated:

" .... it is presumed that notes valid on their
face were executed without fraud on the part of
the payee .... "
and further it is stated:
"The burden of proof on issues raised by defendant's
denial of the validity of the instrument is on him
where he admits execution thereof .... "
Defendants, as a defense, have asserted that the
note was signed in blank and that _the completion of the blanks
by whomever made, was unauthorized.

Incomplete instruments arE

discussed in Section 70A-3-115 UCA 1953:
"70A-3_-115. Incomplete instruments. --- (1) When
a paper whose contents at the time of signing show
that it is intended to become an instrument is
signed while still incomplete in any necessary
respect, it cannot be enforced until completed,
but when it is completed in accordance with
authority given, it is effective as completed.
"(2) If the completion is unauthorized, the rules
as to material alteration apply (section 70A-3-407),
even though the paper was not delivered by the
maker or drawer; but the burden of establishing
that any completion is unauthorized is on the
party so asserting." (emphasis added)
In view of the above, the statutory law of Utah
grants recovery by plaintiff on a promissory note even if incomplete when signed by defendants unless defendant can establish a defense.

The statute places the burden of proving that

any completion is unauthorized squarely on the defendants as
they are asserting that the blanks were completed without
authority.
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"The purpose of a trial of the issues is to
have the facts.determined impartially and fairly
by a court or Jury. Jurors as well as judges
must base their verdicts or decisions on the
evidence presented during the trial, not on the
basis of some independent personal investigation
or determination of the facts outside of court.°'
Provo River Water Users Association vs. Carlson,
6 U 2d 161, 308 P2d 264, p. 782.
B.

THAT THE EVIDENCE THAT THE PROMISSORY NOTE WAS

SIGNED IN BLANK WAS NOT COMPETENT.
During the trial the only evidence of unauthorized
completion introduced by defendants was in response to questions
relating to the execution of the note and to other statements,
transactions, and matters of fact equally within the knowledge
of the defendants and Glen S. Humpherys who died May 7, 1975,
and who is the payee of the promissory note in question and
from whom plaintiffs inherited said note.
Section 78-24-2 UCA 1953, also referred to as the
"dead man's statute" is set out below, with emphasis added:
"78-24-2. Who may not be witnesses.
ing persons cannot be witnesses:

----The follow-

"(l) Those who are of unsound mind at the time
of their production for examination.
"(2) Children under ten years of age, who appear
incapable of receiving just impressions of the
facts respecting which they are examined, or of
relating them truly.
"(3)
civil action, suit or
ing, an any person irect y intereste in t e
event thereof, and any person from, through or under
whom such party or interested person derived his
interest or title or any part thereof, when the
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such action, suit or roceedin claims or o oses, sues, or e ends, as
guar ian o an insane or incompetent person,
or as the executor or administrator, heir, legatee-,-or devisee of ·an dec·eased erson, or as
guar ian, assignee or grantee, :-rect y or remotely, of such heir, legatee or d7visee, as to any
statement by, or transaction with, such deceased,
insane or incompetent person or matter of fact
whatever, which must have been equall within
t e
now e ge o
ot t e witness· an sue insane,
incompetent or deceased person, unless such witness is called to testify thereto by such adverse
party so claiming or opposing suing or defending,
in such action, suit or proceeding."
Plaintiffs objected to the

answe~ing

of the questioru

concerning the form of the note when executed and to other
questions relating to the completion of the note or to authorit
for completing the note on grounds of defendants' incompetency
based on the dead man's statute quoted above.

(T. 27 and T. ST

All of defendants' testimony concerning the completion of the
note was of such a nature as to have been equally within the
knowledge of defendants and the dead man, Glen S. Humpherys, anc
should have been excluded.
The application to the facts of the instant case is a
classic example of the reasons for the enactment of the dead man
statute.

The promissory note in question is regular upon its

face and under the statute cited is enforceable by plaintiffs
upon proof of the signatures.

The evidence of almost eight (8)

years of payment, (Ex. P-4 and 5), the admission by defendant
that he had deducted interest for this loan from his tax return (T. 34), together with the lack of any evidence that
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that defendants acted otherwise than as though they were obligated on the note until Mr. HumpherysJ death further reinforces
the validity of the note.

Allowing defendants to testify that

the note was blank when signed or completed without authority
circumvented the dead man's statute as such matters were equally
within the knowledge of defendants and the deceased.

This is

the kind of evidence intended to be inadmissible as it is selfserving, for defendantst benefit, and impossible for the plain-·
tiffs to counter without the testimony of the deceased payee.
In such cases, the _legislature, by enacting Section 78-24-2 UCA
.. '

1953, has set forth the basic policy to protect heirs of deceased
persons from being subject to evidence that they cannot possibly
meet because of the death of their only witness.
A similar situation results when one is a holder in
due course.

Section 70A-3-407 UCA 1953, expressly states that

a holder in due course may enforce an instrument which has been
completed after execution as it is completed.
1

Further, a person

who by his negligence substantially contributes to an alteration
is precluded from asserting the alteration against a holder in
due course.

See 70A-3-406 UCA 1953.

The statutory law relating to a holder in due course
is another example of the legislature enacting statutes to
protect persons from the unfair positi.on of defending against
an asserted fact which such person has no chance to prove.

As

with the dead man's statute, the legislature has decided that
-11Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the benefit of the doubt should be given to the party with the
objective evidence as the written promissory note, rather than
allowing the self-serving statements of an interested party.

C.

THAT THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 2 AND SPECIAL

VERDICT NO. 1 WERE IN ERROR AND MISLEAD THE. JURY.
Jury Instruction No. 2 (R. 100) did not correctly
state the law as.it should be applied to the instant case.
The evidence concerning the unauthorized completion and signing
of the

promi~sory

note in blank was not competent evidence.and

should have been excluded in accordance with Section 78-24-2

UCA 1953.

The instruction allowed the jury to base its verdict

on the self-serving statements of defendants that the note was
blank and that it was completed without their authorization.
The only evidence from which the jury could have based its find·
ings was evidence of a transaction or matter of fact "equally
within the knowledge of both the witness

and·~···

the deceased

person" and was therefore as a matter of law incompetent evidenc
There is no possibility of plaintiffs• proving that there was an
authorized completion of the note to counter defendants' evidence because of the death of Glen S. Humpherys.

The instructio

was duly objected to by plaintiff upon the above grounds.
(T. 68)

Question No. ·l of the special verdict
objected to by plaintiff on the same grounds.

(R~

113) was

(T. 68)

There

was no evidence presented to the jury which was competent in
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accordance with the dead man's statute.

In view of this,

there was no evidence upon which an affirmative answer could
be supported at law.

Without the testimony of defendants

that the note was signed in blank, the note appeared to be
complete and regular upon its face and the jury could not as
a matter of law find that there was a "fraudulent and material
alteration".

In such case, the note should have been enforced

as written.
In a similar situation involving a question of lack
of consideration, the Utah Supreme Court has applied Section
78-24-2 UCA 1953.

In that case, Burk v·s. Peter, 202 P2d 543,

, 115 Utah 58, the administratrix commenced an action to enforce
a promissory note and the makers of the note attempted to
testify regarding the defense of lack of consideration as did
, defendants in the instant case.

The Supreme Court affirmed

the trial court's exclusion of the evidence on lack of consideration, stating the following:
"The court therefore did not err in refusing
to al~ow appellant to testify concerning the
alleged lack of consideration for the execution of
the note since such fact was equally ":~i-thin the
kn·owledge of a·p·pe11ant and· "de·c·e·a·sed .... " (emphasis
added)
The defense of lack of consideration is set forth in
Section 70A-3-408 UCA 1953 and is treated in a similar manner
as is the defense of material alteration, that is, each defense
is effective against one not a holder in due course but cannot
be asserted against a holder in due course.

The dead man's
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statute should apply to both defenses in the same manner and
evidence as to either lack of consideration or material altera·
tion should be excluded where such evidence was equally within
the knowledge of the defendants and the deceased as was done
in Burk vs. Peter, supra.
The comment made by the jury on the verdict further
indicates their confusion as to the law and is based upon
evidence offered by defendant relating to left over items purchased by defendants which evidence was clearly excluded by
the court during the trial.

In addition, the statement was

not responsive to any question asked of the jury and was not
in accordance with any instructions given the jury.
Based upon the jury's answer to special interrogatory
No. 2, defendants have paid $12,496.93 on the principal of the
note.

The principal-on the face of the note is $25,190.74.

view of this, the unpaid balance of the promissory note is

$12,693.81, and judgment should be entered against defendants
for such amount.

II
THE PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT
AND FOR A NEW TRIAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED
A.

THE NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE WAS DETERMINATIVE

OF THE CASE.
The Affidavit of Nanette Dixon (R. 159) described
the efforts made to find the inventory to prove the value set
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In

forth on the promissory note and to show that the terms of the
agreement had been complied with.

As her affidavit discloses,

she searched every conceivable place where such an inventory
was likely to be prior to the trial.

This was over a pe.riod

of three years.
The affidavit of G. Don Kennedy, the man who actually
supervised the taking of the inventory, indicates that he was
contacted several years prior to the trial in an effort to find
the inventory and to verify the amounts.
The items constituting the inventory and attached to
Mr. Kennedy's affidavit were eventually found in a hunting
closet in a small box hidden in the back of and between two
shelves.

The items they were with were in no way related to

the decedent's personal papers or drug store business.

There

was no advantage to or benefit for plaintiff to have not produced the items at the trial.

Plaintiffs knew before the trial

that the inventory items were an important element of the case
and had no reason r.ot to produce or try to locate such items
prior to trial.
The newly discovered evidence consisted of adding
~achine

tapes, a diagram and a summary of the inventory taken

by the Rocky Mountain Wholesale Inventory crew of the deceased
Glen S. Humphrey's drug store in accordance with the agreement
Exhibit P-3.

The affidavit of G. Don Kennedy, who was one of

the people who took the

invento~y

in question, (R. 162) identi-

fies the documents as those taken in accordance with the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Agreement Exhibit P-3.

This evidence is crucial to plaintiff~

case as it is the proof of the inventory required in accordanc
with agreement-P-3 to establish the.value for the deferred pay

ments provided in the agreement and set out in the Note, Exhib
P-2.

Thus, if in fact the note were signed in blank, the

inventory taken by the independent inventory crew would establish the authority to complete the note in accordance with the
inventory.
It should be noted that the inventory reflects a
total value of the inventory of the drug store to be

$31,190.7~

Defendants introduced certain checks at the trial as defendants
Exhibit No. 12.

One of the ch.eeks, Number 10164, marked defend

ants' Exhibit No. 6, of Mack's Pharmacy, was signed by defendan
William M. Stoddard and d·ated 12/30/67 was in the amount of
$6,000.00.

The date corresponds with the date of the promissor

note, plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 2, and the face of the note equal
the Inventory of $31,190.74, less the $6,000.00 down payment,
or $25, 190. 74.

Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 4 reflects the $6, 000 .01

payment on December 30, 1967.
The new evidence provides proof of the inventory and
the amount upon which the sale of Glen's Rexall Drug was based.
These items provide the information which the memorandum decisic
stated was necessary to support the completion of the promissor)
note in question.
In his memorandum decision (R. 181) dated November 5,
1979, the trial judge stated:
-16-
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"The Court is also of the opinion that the
newly discovered evidence would not change the
verdict of the jury. The fact that an inventory
may have been made would not be evidence that it
had been received and agreed to by defendants."
The Agreement, Exhibit P-3, states in part as
follows:
"l. That an inventory of all of said items
shall be taken by a crew known as THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN
WHOLESALE INVENTORY CREW on the 31st day of n·ecember,
1967. Said inventory so taken shall keep separate
the prescription items which include the bottles,
vials, etc.. , and pharmaceutical supplies used in the
sale of prescriptions as one item, so that the value
thereof may be determined separately and the balance
of all of the merchandise shall be kept in another
separate group.
·"2. That the prescription items and the values
thereof, when so determined, shall be paid for at
the amount determined immediately after the taking
thereof. That the value of the balance of the .items
taken, when so determined, shall be divided by
twelve (12) and one-twelth (l/12th) of said amount
shall be paid each month commencing with the 1st
day of February, 1968, and to continue thereafter
each month until a year ~as past; granting to the
purchasers, however, a grace period of ten (10)
days from each due date, each month."
There is no language in the Agreement indicating that
defendants must agree to the inventory taken.

It states that

the amount determined by the inventory shall be divided by 12
to determine payments.

Thus, the agreement would provide the

authority to complete the promissory note,
In addition, the proof of the inventory provides the
consideration for the note and substantiates· the amount claimed
to be due to plaintiff and is, therefor, determinative of the
case.
..17-
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B.

BASED UPON THE DISCOVERY OF NEW EVIDENCE WHICH

BY DUE DILIGENCE COULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISCOVERED.
Rule 60 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that relief may be granted from a final judgment where
." .... (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence coul1
not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under
Rule 59b .... ", and " ... (7) any other reason justifying relief
from operation of the judgment.

The.motion shall be made with·

in a reasonable time and for reasons ..... (2) .... not more than
three months after judgment, order or proceeding was entered
or taken."
Plaintiffs' motion based upon Rule 60(a)' was filed
on March 2, 1979, within the three month period (R. 135) of
the entry of the final order and.was thus timely.

The

importance of the evidence has been previously stated in II A
above.

With respect to the requirement of due d·iligence,

plaintiff Nanette Dixon filed ·an Affidavit.(R. 159), in which
she· indicated she began searching for the inventory at about
the time defendant stopped making payments (November 1975);
that she spent several days devoted to the search of her
father's effects; that she contacted one of the men who did
the inventory, but was advised that no record was maintained
and that the only records were given.to Mr. Humpherys; that
she again searched, but was unable to locate the inventory
documents; that before the trial she again searched without
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success; and that after all these searches she found the
inventory of February 3, 1979, in an old hunting closet among
items unrelated to the drug store or other business items, in
a location in which she had to bend down to see because of
its location on the back of a shelf.
In the trial judge's memorandum, he states (R. 181):
"The new evidence had been removed from a
safe and stored in a box in a closet .... "
This statement is not supported by the evidence. In
the plaintiff's affidavit, she stated:
"In. a wooden hunting closet containing some
shelves with boxes on them and a regular wardrobe
holding hats, old coats and an old jigsaw puzzle
box containing items removed from an old safe and
noticed in the back part of one shelf a small box
which she would not have seen if she had not been
bending down. Upon opening this box she discovered
a diagram, adding machine tapes, and keys to the
safety deposit boxes."
The only evidence as to the location of the items was
the affidavit and does not say the items were ever in the safe
as indicated in the memorandum decision, but that the items in
question were near some items removed from an old safe.
It was never in plaintiffs' interest to fail to locate
the items making up the inventory, as their presence at trial
could only help the plaintiffs' case.

Plaintiff's description

of the many searches over the three years, the contact with Mr.
Kennedy before trial (R. 163), and the finding of the inventory
in such an unlikely location all indicate due diligence as contemplated by Rule 60 for relief from a judgment.

-19-
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C.

BASED UPON OTHER REASON JUSTIFYING RELIEF FROM

THE OPERATION OF THE JUDGMENT.
The newly discovered evidence provides absolute

independent proof of the value of the drug store inventory
transferred to defendants as a part of the transaction during
which Exhibits P-2 and P-3 were executed.

It proves the

authenticity of the amount of the note and is the basis for
the authority granted by the agreement to complete the note
if it was in fact signed in blank.

Considering the weight the

new evidence must be given, it would change the result of the
case and in the interest of justice, a new trial should be
granted so that the new evidence may be considered.

III
THE

JURY'S FINDING AS TO ATTORNEY'S FEES

WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.

Tpe jury's findings as to attorneys' fees were not
supported by the evidence.

The only evidence admitted and

which the jury had available for consideration was that a
reasonable attorneys' fee for
was $3, 320. 00.

en_~orcing th~

promissory note

When this evidence wa·s admitted there was no

cross-examination and the defendants introduced no eviden-ce
to contradict the services, reasonableness or amount of fee.
Thus, the jury's verdict of zero was not supported by any
evidence.
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CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the plaintiffs
were entitled to recover, based upon the proof of the
defendants having signed the promissory note in question,
there being no

compe~ent

evidence to give rise to a defense

or to support the jury's verdict that there was a fraudulent
and material alteration.

Plaintiff is therefore entitled to

a judgment for $12,693.81 representing the unpaid balance of
the note, $3,320.00 attorneys fees, costs, and interest at
the rate of six percent (6%) per annum.
In the alternative, plaintiff is entitled to a new
trial in which to present the newly discovered evidence.

Respectfully submitted,

536 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
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CERTTFICATE

O'~

MAILING

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing
Brief of Appellant was mailed to Defendants-Respondents'
attorney, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
Dale M. Dorius, Esq.
Attorney at Law
P. 0. Box U
Brigham City, Utah 84302
on this

day of
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